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THE OHIO LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION'S
RIGHT TO REGULATE
INTRODUCTION
T OPLESS" AND "BOTTOMLESS" dancing is a recent social phenomenon
utilized by liquor permit holders to create an atmosphere that will
attract the potential customer to enter the door and buy a drink. Although
various sociological theories have been advanced regarding this type of
entertainment,1 its primary motivation is profit.'
Just as the potential for profit is great, so arguably is the potential
for harm to the community by this "offensive" entertainment. Recognizing
this potential, the courts have formulated three rather startling theories to
buttress the state's control over liquor regulation. The first theory is that
the state enjoys a "super" police power when dealing with the regulation
of liquor and may promulgate broad, general regulations without incurring
the application of the "void for vagueness"' standard to such regulations.'
Secondly, a liquor license is considered a privilege, revocable by the state
at its discretion, and not a vested property right. Absent a statute, such a
privilege is not protected by the due process guarantees of the fourteenth
amendment, and may be revoked without prior notice or hearing.
5 Thirdly,
it has been recognized that "[s]tates may sometimes proscribe expression
which is directed to the accomplishment of an end which the state has
declared to be illegal when such expression consists, in part, of 'conduct'
or 'action'."' Thus, the state may constitutionally restrict forms of enter-
tainment or expression normally protected by the first amendment on the
authority of the twenty-first amendment which confers "something more
than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals."'
HISTORY
Regulation of the liquor industry has had a vacillating history. Before
the Union was formed, liquor, like any other commodity, was subject to
regulation by the colonies. When the Constitution was adopted and the
I See generally M. GOLDSTEiN & H. KANT, PORNOGAPHY AND SEXUAL DEVIANCE (1973).
2 See A.B. Jac, Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 31 Ohio App. 2d 9, 12, 285 N.E.2d 763, 765
(1972), where the bartender's assertion was: "It's been a long winter and we haven't made
any money, and this is the way to make it." See also State ex rel. Keating v. Film, 27 Ohio
St. 2d 278, 272 N.E.2d 137 (1971), for the contention that in Ohio profit is a "dirty" word.
3 See text accompanying notes 39-40 infra.
4 E.g., Salem v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 34 Ohio St. 2d 244, 298 N.E.2d 138 (1973).
5 See A.B.Jac, Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 31 Ohio App. 2d 9, 285 N.E.2d 763 (1972).
6 California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117 (1972).
7Id. at 114 See Note, 6 AKRON L. REv. 247 (1973).
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Government of the United States organized, the states, by operation of
the commerce clause, were stripped of the power to prevent or constrict
the flow of commerce across their respective borders for their economic
advantage.' Absent a need for uniformity, however, the federal government's
power to regulate was not absolute.' The state, through the operation of its
police power, could pass legislation governing matters of local concern
that affected or regulated interstate commerce in order to promote the
health, safety and welfare of its citizenry." Yet, even though a state could
regulate the sale or use of liquor by the exercise of its police power, the
liquor industry continued to enjoy the protections of both the privileges and
immunities clause and the commerce clause of the United States Constitution,
which the state regulation could not transcend."
Constitutional guarantees to the liquor industry ceased with the en-
actment of the eighteenth amendment in 1919.1 Rights which the liquor
industry enjoyed under the Constitution were nullified because the Constitu-
tion itself divested the liquor industry of its legal existence. The states were
forbidden to permit liquor to be manufactured or sold within their borders.
The repeal of the eighteenth amendment fourteen years later was by
no means the rebirth of the liquor industry. While the first section of the
twenty-first amendment 3 removed the federal proscription against the
States, thereby permitting liquor within their borders, the second section
8 See Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949); Leisy v. Harden, 135 U.S. 100
(1890); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888); B. SCHWARTZ,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 108 (1972).
9 See Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285 (1899); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 144 (1851).
"Old.; Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
See also Hackensack Meadow Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Authority, 68
N.J. 451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975).
'See, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888); Wynhamer v. People, 13 N.Y. (3 Keen) 378 (1856).
12 U. S. CONST. amend. XVIII, which provides:
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the ex-
portation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction
thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
1' U. S. CONST. amend. XXI provides:
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States
is hereby repealed. Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. (emphasis added).
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failed to revive the constitutionally protected rights' which existed prior to
the passage of the eighteenth amendment.15
The broad grant of authority by the twenty-first amendment to the states
to regulate the use, distribution, or consumption of liquor has suspended
the normal operation of the commerce clause." In Hostetter v. Idlewild
Liquor Corp.,"' the United States Supreme Court held that by reason of the
twenty-first amendment "a State is totally unconfined by traditional Com-
merce Clause limitations when it restricts the importation of intoxicants
destined for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders."'
The justification for expanding the commercial regulation of the liquor
industry under the twenty-first amendment, so as to include the regulation
of entertainment in a liquor license premise is founded on a "harmful po-
tentiality" theory.'" The basis for this theory is that there are obvious harmful
potentialities when the sale of intoxicating beverages occurs in retail outlets.
These potentialities not only necessitate that the sale of liquor be strictly
regulated, but that business conduct and the premises within which liquor is
sold must be regulated, as well, to avoid such harm.2" Activities incidental
to the sale of liquor regulated by Ohio are profit margins,2' price advertising,"
14 See, e.g., Mahoney v. Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 404 (1937), where it is stated: "A
classification recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the
Fourteenth." For a general treatment of this problem see Note, Twenty-first Amendment
Limitation on Power Granted to the States, 10 GA. ST. B.J. 336 (1973). See also California
v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 135 (1972), (Marshall, J., dissenting), ("I am at a loss to under-
stand why the Twenty-first Amendment should be thought to override the First Amendment
but not the Fourteenth.").
'5 A.B. Jac, Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 31 Ohio App. 2d 9, 13, 285 N.E.2d 763, 765
(1972).
is Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v.
Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939).
17 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
Is id. at 330. See also Note, 6 AKRON L. REV. 247, at 248-49 & n. 16 (1973).
19See Ziffrin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939); Major Liquors v. Omaha, 188 Neb. 628, 198
N.W.2d 483 (1972); Solomon v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 2d 31, 212 N.E.2d
595 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 928 (1966).
2 0 See generally Comment, The Liquor Industry: The Licensees' Viewpoint, Legislation,
Administration, and Enforcement, 8 CREIGHTON L. Rnv. 979 (1975); Note, Control Over
Ultra Vires Activity of the Liquor Board, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 359 (1958).
2 1 See Omo REv. CODE ANN. §4301.041 (Page 1973), which reads in part as follows:
The liquor control commission may determine and fix by regulation the minimum per-
centage mark-up for sales at retail of beer, lager beer, ale, stout, porter, or any other
brewed or malt liquor or malt beverages, whether in case lot or less.
22 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §4301.211 (Page 1973), which provides:
No holder of a permit issued by the department of liquor control shall advertise the
retail price of beer and malt beverages in any newspaper, circular, radio broadcast,
television telecast or by any other media of advertising off the premises of the permit
holder.
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who may purchase, 3 hours of sale," places for consumption, 5 and the type
of entertainment which may be presented. 6
REGULATION IN OHIO
Ohio has delegated the regulation of the liquor industry to the Liquor
Control Commission (LCC), an administrative body consisting of three
commissioners appointed by the governor. Section 4301.03 of the Ohio
Revised Code empowers the LCC to regulate liquor in Ohio:
The Liquor Control Commission may adopt and promulgate, repeal,
rescind, and amend, in the manner required by this section, rules, regu-
lations, standards, requirements, and orders necessary to carry out
Chapters 4301 and 4303 .... 27
Realizing that strict scrutiny of all license permit holders would be
difficult due to the limited number of supervisors employed by the LCC, the
legislature added a self-policing feature to this section of the Code. Sub-
section (B) of the statute provides that the regulations of the LCC may
include the following:
Rules, regulations, and orders providing in detail for the conduct of
any retail business authorized under permits issued pursuant to such
chapters, with a view to insuring compliance with such chapters and
laws relative thereto, and the maintenance of public decency, sobriety,
and good order in any place licensed under such permits. 8 (emphasis
added)
Unlike other jurisdictions which have denied liquor permit holders the
usual protections encompassed in procedural due process, 9 Ohio has enacted
statutory provisions which require notice, hearing and appeal, prior to
21 OmIo REV. CODE ANN. §4301.22(A) (Page 1973), which provides in part: "No beer shalh
be sold to any person under eighteen years of age ... "
24 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §4301.22(D) (Page 1973), which provides:
No sales of intoxicating liquor shall be made after two-thirty a.m. on Sunday or at
retail on a primary or general election day between the hours of six a.m. and seven-
thirty p.m., except that intoxicating liquor may be sold on Sunday under authority of a
permit which authorizes Sunday sale.
26 Omo REv. CODE ANN. §4301.64 (Page 1973).
26 OmIo REV. CODE ANN. §4301.03(B) (Page 1973) which provides:
Rules, regulations, and orders providing in detail for the conduct of any retail business
authorized under permits issued pursuant to such chapters, with a view to insuring
compliance with such chapters and laws relative thereto, and the maintenance of public
decency, sobriety, and good order in any place licensed under such permits.
27 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §4301.03(A) (Page 1973).
2 8 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §4301.03(B) (Page 1973).
29 Smith v. Iowa Liquor Control Comm'n, 169 N.W.2d 803 (Iowa 1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 885 (1969); Pinzino v. Supervisor of Liquor Comm'n, 334 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. 1960); ci
Comment, Beer Permit Revocations in Iowa: The Need for a More Rational Approach, 57
IOWA L. REV. 1409 (1972).
[Vol. 9:4
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revocation of a liquor license." Yet, the LCC, subject to limited judicial
intervention, maintains virtual autonomy in the application of its rules and
regulations to liquor licensees." An appeal of a LCC ruling is obtained only
through the limited provisions of Section 119.12 of the Ohio Revised
Code. 2 Under this section the only standard applied on review of a LCC
decision is: "[T]hat the order be supported by reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence and is in accordance with the law.""8 Thus, an affirmation
usually proceeds upon a determination that there is some evidence in the
record on which to support the LCC finding."
Although the Ohio liquor licensee enjoys more procedural rights
than his counterparts in other states, he is still subject to the often unfettered
discretion the LCC wields in determining what activities violate its rules
and regulations. Since Ohio public policy regards the sale of alcohol as a
suspect activity, any dispute between a licensee and the LCC which involves
any doubt as to whether a violation exists will normally be resolved in
the state's favor. 8 This attitude is best exemplified by the Ohio Supreme
Court's affirmation of the revocation by the LCC of a liquor permit holder's
license for 28 days in Salem v. Liquor Control Commission.6 Paul
Salem, owner of an Akron nightclub, was charged with violating Liquor
Control Commission Regulation 52," in that he
... did knowingly and/or willfully allow in and upon the premises,
30 Omo REVISED CODE ANN. §4301.27 (Page 1973), which provides:
The board of liquor control may revoke or cancel any permit on its own initiative or
on complaint of the department of liquor control or of any person, after a hearing at
which the holder shall be given an opportunity to be heard in such manner and upon
such notice as prescribed by the rules and regulations of the board.
31 See Salem v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 34 Ohio St. 2d 244, 298 N.E.2d 138 (1973);
Angola Corp. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 33 Ohio App. 2d 87, 292 N.E.2d 886 (1972).
82 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §119.12 (Page 1969).
33 Id. See generally Rutledge, Administrative Review and the Ohio Modern Courts Amendment,
35 OmHO ST. L.J. 41 (1974); Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions in Ohio, 34
Omo ST. L.J. 853 (1973).
3 4 E.g., Angola Corp. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 33 Ohio App. 2d 87, 292 N.E.2d 886
(1972).
35 See cases cited note 31 supra.
38 34 Ohio St. 2d 244, 298 N.E.2d 138.
ST Liquor Control Commission Regulation 52, reads:
No permit holder shall knowingly or willfully allow in, upon or about his licensed
premises improper conduct of any kind, type or character; any improper disturbances,
lewd, immoral activities or brawls; or any indecent, profane, or obscene language, songs,
entertainment, literature, pictures or advertising materials; nor shall any entertainment
consisting of the spoken language or songs which can or may convey either directly
or by implication an immoral meaning to be permitted in, upon or about the permit
premises.
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improper conduct. . . [in permitting] a female to dance with insuffi-
cient attire, to wit, pasties which covered only the nipple and areola
portion of her breasts, the overall effect of which was to portray the
female as dancing in a 'topless' state."
The Salem case is important because it represents the position of Ohio
on three controversial issues regarding the regulations of live entertainment
in bars. First, although Section 4301.03"1 of the Ohio Revised Code dic-
tates that the LCC rules be promulgated in detail "with a view to insuring
compliance", the Ohio Supreme Court chose not to subject LCC regulations
to any standard of specificity on their face; rather the court opted to defer
such determination to a case by case approach.4 0 Second, the court ap-
proved the position that a liquor license is a privilege and not a property
right." Finally, when the LCC suspends a liquor license on the grounds
that the owner of the premises permitted a female to dance "topless", the
constitutional guarantees of the first amendment are inapplicable. 2
SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENTS
A general principle of due process is that a criminal or regulatory stat-
ute is void for vagueness if it does not clearly define the prohibited conduct. 3
Three reasons underlie this basic principle. First, prohibited acts must
be adequately explicit to give notice and warn the individual, so that he
or she is sufficiently informed as to what constitutes proscribed conduct.
Second, definite standards must be specified to avoid arbitrary and dis-
criminatory application of the law.4 ' Third, vague and obscure laws have
a "chilling effect" on first amendment freedoms; because of uncertainty the
individual is forced to veer wide of conduct which may be characterized as
unlawful.'
Entertainment consisting of dancing, either solo or otherwise, which may or can,
either directly or by implication, suggest an immoral act is prohibited. Nor shall any
permit holder possess or cause to have printed or distributed any lewd, immoral, in-
decent, or obscene literature, pictures or advertising material.
[hereinafter referred to as Regulation 52].
38 34 Ohio St. 2d at 244, 298 N.E.2d at 139.
39 See note 27 and accompanying text supir.
40 34 Ohio St. 2d at 249, 298 N.E.2d at 142.
41Id.
4 2 Id. See also California v. LaRue, 405 U.S. 109 (1972).
43See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1965); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1940). See generally Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960);Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1430 (1941).
4 4 See M. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 618-
20 (2nd ed. 1973).
"Smith v. Gogven, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972);
See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844
(1970).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:4
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Section 4301.03 (B) 4" of the Ohio Revised Code also mandates the
need for specificity. This requirement of specificity was asserted by the
liquor licensee in Salem, as a defense in an action to suspend his liquor
license. In particular, the permit holder complained that the words "im-
proper conduct" as used in Regulation 52 did not describe in sufficient
detail the proscribed conduct for which a license could be revoked."
In answering the question of specificity, the Ohio Supreme Court
pointed out that the standard for specificity in a civil trial was not as great
as the requirement for specificity in a criminal trial. 8 The court, however,
failed to state exactly what standard of specificity is required in a civil trial.
It chose instead, to rely on the reasoning adhered to in A.B. Jac, Inc. v. Li-
quor Control Commission,"9 that it would be too burdensome for the LCC to
spell out in detail any specific requirements for improper conduct:
The regulation is in general terms, but considering the ingenuity of
man, to specify all of the acts which might offend public decency,
sobriety and good order, would require a regulation which would go
on ad infinitum.5"
Thus the court was unwilling to establish any judicial guidelines for specifi-
city.
This lack of concrete standards has created a situation in which the
LCC has complete discretion to decide what is "improper." A subjective
rather than objective determination of propriety is the inevitable result of
delegating basic policy matters to the LCC. In Khoury v. Board of Liquor
Control,5 a member of the State Liquor Board made the following comment
about "improper conduct":
The Board presented its views in no uncertain terms about a year
ago that.., anything that tended toward indecency, or in any way
was sexy, would not be tolerated in connection with a permit holder's
place of business."2
The Salem court justified the granting of such broad authority to the LCC
on the basis of the state's police power. The court maintained:
The police power of the state is fully competent to regulate the business,
46 See note 26 supra.
47 34 Ohio St. 2d at 246, 298 N.E.2d at 140.
48Id.
49 31 Ohio App. 2d 9, 285 N.E.2d 763 (1972).
50 34 Ohio St. 2d at 247, 298 N.E.2d at 141.
5181 N.E.2d 634 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948).
52 Id. at 636.
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to mitigate its evils, or to suppress it entirely .... The manner and
extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority.53
The court in Salem reasoned that since the state can regulate the hours
a bar may remain open, it may also regulate the conduct within the bar.54
This rationale, however, fails to illustrate effectively how a lack of definite-
ness in the promulgated regulations is permissible. No doubt exists as to
the state's authority to regulate the "use, distribution, or consumption" within
its borders; yet, it cannot escape its constitutional obligations to establish
definite standards of regulation which will afford the liquor licensee notice
of what activities would violate LCC regulations. Without such specificity of
regulation in matters such as the hours of operation or acceptable enter-
tainment, a liquor permit holder would be forced to guess how late he could
stay open and the LCC subsequently could decide his guess was wrong
and suspend his liquor permit.
Ohio's policy of granting the LCC authority to promulgate its own
regulations in broad and general terms was criticized by Justice Clifford
Brown in A.B. Jac, Inc.5" Justice Brown stated that if standards are not
established, there is nothing to "prevent the trier of a cause from creating
his own standard in each case."56 Justice Brown reasoned that the regulations
and specifically "LCC- 1-52 to be valid must describe an act which is definable,
and it is required to be definable if we are to elude the 'vice of vagueness'.""
He further contended that the results precipitating from the enforcement of
general regulations may be just as ridiculous as requiring enumerations of
"improper conduct" ad infinitum:
Conceivably, since in this case, the regulation was directed solely to
dress, or the insufficiency thereof, this empowers the commission to
suspend a liquor license because the permit holder willfully allowed 'im-
proper conduct' on the permit premises by consenting to the patrons
[sic] enjoyments of refreshments or entertainment, or both, without the
adornment of bow ties, cuff links and pincenez glasses. The absence
of standards or guidelines can conjure additional multitudinous absurd
results.5"
The liquor licensee's complaint is not that the state has no power to
regulate the sale of liquor, but that there are no prescribed standards on
53 34 Ohio St. 2d at 247, 298 N.E.2d at 141.
54Id. at 246, 298 N.E.2d at 141.
5531 Ohio App. 2d 9, 14, 285 N.E.2d, 763, 766 (Brown, J., concurring).
56Id. at 15, 285 N.E.2d at 766; accord Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
57 31 Ohio App. 2d at 15, 285 N.E.2d at 766; see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957).
58 31 Ohio App. 2d at 15, 285 N.E.2d at 767.
[Vol. 9:4
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 9 [1976], Iss. 4, Art. 10
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss4/10
which they can rely. Although the power granted by the twenty-first
amendment to the state is broad, the requirement that regulations be specific,
so as to provide notice and establish ascertainable standards, would not
impair the state's reasonable exercise of that power. Specificity of standards
would result in adjudications based on merit," rather than the whim of the
LCC.
LICENSE RELATIONSHIP
The second point of controversy in the regulation of entertainment in
bars involves the special licensor-licensee relationship which the Ohio
courts consistently have maintained exists between the LCC and the liquor
permit holder."0 The foundation for such a relationship lies in the rationale
that the sale of liquor is basically repugnant to the public health, morals and
welfare, and only to the extent that it is relegated to the status of a privilege,
and not a property right,"' subject to the discretion of the state legislature,
2
is it tolerable.
The effect of classifying a liquor license as a privilege is twofold. First,
vague regulations are not considered offensive, because by accepting the
license, the liquor permit holder has impliedly agreed to obey whatever
conditions are imposed.6 Secondly, Ohio courts have consistently main-
tained that the fourteenth amendment does not apply to liquor licenses.
6" The
court in Salem, addressing itself to the issue of whether the fourteenth amend-
ment is applicable to liquor licenses, held:
Realizing that the liquor industry requires... regulation, the states
have not granted irrevocable permits in the nature of vested
property rights to retail liquor businesses, but instead have issued "lic-
enses." A "license" has been consistently considered by courts as a "per-
sonal and temporary permit or privilege, and not a natural right, to be
enjoyed only so long as the conditions and restrictions governing its
continuance are complied with.... ."I'
The conditional nature of this privilege was again illustrated by language
in Angola v. Liquor Control Commission,"6 suggesting that permit holders
59 Clark v. Fremont, 377 F.Supp. 327 (D.Neb. 1973).
6 0 See, e.g., Salem v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 34 Ohio St. 2d 244, 298 N.E.2d 138 (1973);
Abraham v. Fioramonte, 158 Ohio St. 2d 213, 107 N.E.2d 321 (1952); State ex rel Zugravu
v. O'Brien, 130 Ohio St. 23, 196 N.E. 664 (1935). See also Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1067 (1954).
61 Angola Corp. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 33 Ohio App. 2d 87, 292 N.E.2d 886 (1973).
62 See, e.g., Solomon v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 2d 31, 212 N.E.2d 595 (1965).
63 Angola Corp. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 33 Ohio App. 2d 87, 292 N.E.2d 886 (1973).
See also Solomon v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 4 Ohio St. 2d 31, 212 N.E.2d 595 (1965).
64 Salem v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 34 Ohio St. 2d 244, 298 N.E.2d 138 (1973).
65Id. at 245, 298 N.E.2d at 140, quoting 45 AM. Jua. Intoxicating Liquors §115 (1969).
But see Page v. Jackson, 398 F. Supp. 263 (N.D.Ga. 1975).
66 33 Ohio App. 2d 87, 292 N.E.2d 886 (1972).
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may not even question the validity of the regulations of the LCC: "A permit
holder enjoys the privilege of doing business in Ohio subject to the regu-
lations imposed by the commission. He may simply meet the requirements
or forfeit his privilege."" T The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted Angola
in such a manner that a permit holder must accept what the "Liquor Con-
trol Commission believes is consistent with 'public decency, sobriety, and
good order.' "68
This special license relationship has resulted in a double standard for
judging conduct. First, a general standard is applicable to entertainment
everywhere except where liquor is sold; and second, a strict standard is
applied to places which sell alcoholic beverages allegedly to insure that they
will be provided with suitable, decent, and proper conduct. Angola solidified
this double standard:
We are not concerned with general standards applied to a variety of
places of entertainment or amusement involving social mores or com-
munity social levels, but the application of a regulatory measure as to
the conduct of a permit holder in the operation of his business. 9
The decisions in Salem and Angola, however, fail to recognize that the
substantial investment by the liquor licensee in his place of business gives
him the equivalent of a "de facto property interest" in his liquor license."'
Other courts, recognizing this de facto property interest, have been willing
to accept that the status of the permit holder, as a businessman, gives him
at least some protection.71 The court of appeals in Khoury v. Board of
Liquor Control,2 for example, recognized that, although a liquor license
was not a vested property right, the heavy investment of the permit holder
in his establishment should be a factor which requires fairness and reliability
from the LCC. 2
DETERMINATION OF OBSCENITY AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
The third area of controversy in the regulation of an establishment
67 Id. at 91, 292 N.E.2d at 889.
68 34 Ohio St. 2d at 246, N.E.2d at 140. (emphasis added).
69 33 Ohio App. 2d at 91, 292 N.E.2d at 889. See also A.B.Jac, Inc. v. Liquor Control
Comm'n, 31 Ohio App. 2d 9, 14, 285 N.E.2d 763, 766 (1972), where the court simply stated
that "a permit holder enjoys a privilege and not a right surrounded by constitutional pro-
tections." But cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
70 Manos v. Green Bay, 372 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Wisc. 1974).
71 Page v. Coggins, Civil No. 75-197 (N.D. Ga. June 6, 1975).
72 81 N.E.2d 634 (Ohio App. 1948). See also In re Mendlowitz, 9 Ohio App. 2d 83, 222
N.E.2d 835 (1967).
78 81 N.E.2d at 637.
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operating under a liquor permit is whether the regulation of entertainment
such as "topless" dancing conflicts with rights guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. The crux of the problem is whether any first amendment standards
of obscenity are applicable to hearings conducted by liquor control boards.
The answer seems to be that the LCC is not bound by any constitutional
standard for obscenity when judging entertainment, but may apply its own
standards as to what is obscene."4
The landmark decision in this area, California v. LaRue,7" has been
closely followed by the Ohio courts. In LaRue, liquor license holders and
dancers performing at their premises instituted a declaratory judgment action
against the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control challenging
the constitutionality of the Board's regulations prohibiting per se certain live
entertainment in bars. These regulations were drafted as a result of numerous
complaints to the Department that sexually explicit entertainment in
"topless" and "bottomless' bars and nightclubs" led to sexual contact
between customers and entertainers, prostitution, rape, indecent exposure,
and assaults on police officers. The purpose of the Department's regulations
was to eliminate these incidental occurrences. To effectuate this purpose,
the Department promulgated a series of regulations prohibiting certain
conduct in establishments where liquor is served.
The district court in LaRue found the following regulations by the
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control to be unconstitutional
on their face:
(a) The performance of acts or simulated acts, of sexual intercourse,
masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation, or any
sexual acts which are prohibited by law;
(b) The actual simulated touching, caressing or fondling on the breasts,
buttocks, anus or genitals;
(c) The actual simulated displaying of the pubic hair, anus, vulva
or genitals.77
74 See notes 49-59 and accompanying text supra.
75 409 U.S. 409 (1972). See also Note, California v. LaRue, 12 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1008
(1974); Note, California v. LaRue: The Demise of the "Bottomless" Bar, 1 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 129 (1973).
76 Evidence taken at public hearings indicated:
•.. that in licensed establishments where 'topless' and 'bottomless' dancing occurred, num-
erous incidents of legitimate concern to the Department had developed. Customers were
found engaging in oral copulation with women entertainers; customers engaged in public
masturbation; and customers placed rolled currency either directly into the vaginas of a
female entertainer, or on the bar so that she might pick it up herself. Numerous other
forms of contact between the mouths of customers and the vaginal area of female per-
formers were reported to have occurred. 409 U.S. at 111.
77 LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 348 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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On appeal the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the district
court's decision. In rejecting the limitations placed on States' authority
in this area by the district court, the majority, per Justice Rehnquist, stated:
We conceive the State's authority.., to be somewhat broader than
did the District Court. This is not to say that all such conduct and
performance are without the protection of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments ....
The Department's conclusion, embodied in these regulations, that cer-
tain sexual performances and the dispensation of liquor by the drink
ought not to occur at premises that have licenses was not an irrational
one. Given the added presumption in favor of the validity of the
state regulation in this area that the Twenty-first Amendment requires,
we cannot hold that the regulations on their face violate the Federal
Constitution."8
The majority, however, rejected the proposition that the twenty-first amend-
ment "supercedes all other provisions of the United States Constitution in
the area of liquor regulations." 9 The court quoted the decision in Hostetter
v. Idlewild Liquor Corp." to support this position:
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are
parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution,
each must be considered in the light of the other and in the context
of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case."'"
In arriving at the result reached in LaRue, the court appeared to be more
concerned with the immediate facts of the case before it than with the States'
pervasive power to regulate liquor licenses.
The opinion paid homage to rights guaranteed under the first and
fourteenth amendments by citing the rationales of Wisconsin v. Constantin-
eau82 and Hostetter, which imply that constitutional rights exist even in the
area of liquor control. However, the opinion then stated that acts which may
be "within the limits of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression
... are not forbidden across the board. They are merely proscribed.., in
establishments that it licenses to sell liquor by the drink." 3
To buttress its argument that the regulations were constitutionally
78409 U.S. 109, 118-19.
,old. at 115. See 409 U.S. at 120n. (Stewart, J., concurring).
80 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
81409 U.S. at 115, quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Control Corp., 377 U.S. at 332.
82 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
83409 U.S. at 118.
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valid, the majority found it necessary to distinguish between obscenity on
the printed page8" and conduct:
[That] as the mode of expression moves from the printed page to the
commission of public acts that may themselves violate valid penal
statutes, the scope of permissible state regulations significantly
increases. 5
After careful analysis the court determined that since the regulations were
directed at prohibiting movies or live entertainment "that partake more of
gross sexuality than of communication", such acts would be obscene under
either standard.8"
The dissent did not express the same confidence in the wisdom of the
state liquor agencies to promulgate regulations which would prohibit only
"bacchanalian revelries." Justice Douglas did not agree that first amendment
freedoms may be disregarded because liquor regulation was involved: "Cer-
tainly a play which passes muster under the first amendment is not made
illegal because it is performed in a beer garden."87
Justice Brennan dissenting in a separate opinion reasoned that the
surrender of first amendment rights as a condition to the grant of a license
was an unconstitutional burden: "Nothing in the language or history of the
Twenty-first Amendment authorizes the States to use their liquor licensing
power as a means for the deliberate inhibition of protected, even if dis-
tasteful, forms of expression."88
In Salem, the Ohio Supreme Court cited LaRue to maintain that the
state is possessed of substantial state power in regulating the liquor industry
from the grant given to it by the twenty-first amendment, and that some
84 Whether printed material is obscene is determined by the Miller test. The basic guidelines
for the trier of facts under the Miller test are: (1) whether "the average person applying
contemporary community standards" would find that the work taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest; (2) whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (3) whether the work
taken as a whole lacks serious literary artistic political or scientific value." Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1972).
85 409 U.S. at 117.
86 Id. at 118, where the court stated:
But we would poorly serve both the interests for which a state may validly seek vindica-
tion and the interests protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments were we to
insist that the sort of bacchanalian revelries that the Department sought to prevent
by these liquor regulations were the constitutional equivalent of a performance by a
scantily clad ballet troupe in a theater.
87 Id. at 121.
88 Id. at 123. Also, expressing his views in a separate dissent, Justice Marshall rejected the
majority's use of the license "privilege" argument, the state's broad regulatory power under the
Twenty-first Amendment, the argument that conduct rather than expression was involved, and
that entertainment only of a gross sexual was proscribed. Id. at 123-39.
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activity done outside the confines of a tavern, which would enjoy first amend-
ment protection, is stripped of such protection when done within tavern
walls. 9
The Ohio Supreme Court also avoided the first amendment question
by not deciding whether a "topless" dancer constituted gross sexual conduct
or expression under the first amendment. Instead, the court magically
transformed the dancer into a "commercial product" and stated that: "... the
commission, viewing this 'product' as improper, has seen fit to regulate
it by suspending the holder's liquor permit."9
While the majority language in LaRue advocated balancing first
amendment freedoms with the twenty-first amendment, the Ohio position
expressed in Salem, which was decided after LaRue, is that the twenty-first
amendment gives the States unfettered powers in regulating the sale of
alcohol.9
Recent decisions have rejected the unfettered power doctrine accepted
by Salem, and perhaps have narrowed the application of LaRue in the pro-
cess. This trend is evidenced by the federal district court decision in Peto v.
Cook,9 which dealt with the constitutionality of liquor regulations,93 as applied
to the prohibition of certain printed material in liquor permit premises. The
district court found Regulation 52 to be unconstitutional to the extent that it
attempted to regulate printed materials which may have been protected by
the first amendment.9" Specifically determined to be unconstitutional was
the administrative action taken against liquor licensees who possessed printed
matter which had not been previously found to be unconstitutional.9 It
is important to note that the rationale of LaRue was held
... applicable only where certain types of live entertainment... "par-
take more of gross sexuality than of communication"; it reaches only
those situations which can be characterized as "bacchanalian revelries."9
a9 Salem v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 34 Ohio St. 2d at 248, 298 N.E.2d at 142 (1973).
1d. For a general discussion of "commercial product" see Hodges v. File, 332 F. Supp.
504, 509 (D. Neb. 1971), where the court held even if topless dancing involves expression,
it can be classified as commercial advertising because its primary purpose is to promote a
product. Therefore, since the dancing is not aimed at the dissemination of opinion communica-
tion or information it is not protected by the First Amendment. See also Peto v. Cook, 364
F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aIf'd, 415 U.S. 943 (1974).
91 34 Ohio St. 2d at 248, 298 N.E.2d at 142.
92 364 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ohio 1973), affd, 415 U.S. 943 (1974). See Clark v. Fremont, 377
F. Supp. 326 (D. Neb. 1974).
93 See note 37 supra.
94 364 F.Supp. at 4.
95 Id.
9 6 Id. at 5.
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The significance of Peto lies in the fact that not all liquor regulations,
based on the authority emanating from the twenty-first amendment and
which attempt to control "obscenity", are unchallengeable. Peto is also
significant in that the court prohibited the use of certain administrative
measures, such as the revocation of a liquor license without specific standards
to determine whether the challenged material was, in fact, obscene.9"
LaRue attempted to provide a prophylactic solution to the problems
caused by bars utilizing "bacchanalian revelries". But LaRue also created
a void into which conduct which is outside the scope of "gross sexuality"
has fallen.98 This "no man's land" was characterized by the Federal District
Court of Wisconsin in Escheat, Inc. v. Pierstorff.99 "[S]ome shows which
fall somewhere between Mary Poppins, on the one hand, and "bacchanalian
revelries," on the other, even when performed in a bar, continue to be
entitled to first amendment protection."1 9 Without specific regulations or
a judicial determination of obscenity, the area is exclusively shaped by
the LCC.
Clark v. Fremont,"' provides a rationale which Ohio should adopt
in dealing with live entertainment on liquor license premises. If applied to
Ohio, Clark would strip the LCC of its autonomy. The LCC, then,
would not have the broad discretion to arbitrarily revoke or suspend a
license for obscene conduct without " a prompt judicial review to determine
whether the conduct is indeed obscene. '"102
Clark held that topless dancing per se does not fall within the gross
sexual entertainment subject to unrestricted regulation under LaRue."'' 3 The
court noted that "LaRue... was not concerned with the issue of 'topless'
97 Id.
98 See Clark v. Fremont, 377 F. Supp. 327, 339 (D. Neb. 1974), where the court states:
"This court is of the opinion that LaRue does not state that, pursuant to the Twenty-first
Amendment, the Liquor Control authorities can proscribe all topless dancing." cf. Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-33 (1975), in which the Supreme Court, per Justice
Rehnquist, made the following comments concerning LaRue:
Although the customary "bar room" type of nude dancing may involve only the barest
minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.109,
118, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), that this form of entertainment might
be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances. In
LaRue, however, we concluded that the broad powers of the States to regulate the sale
of liquor, conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment, outweighed any First Amendment
interest in nude dancing and that a state could therefore ban such dancing as a part of
its liquor license program.
See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R. 3d 1048 (1973).
99354 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Wisc. 1973).
100 Id. at 1126.
101 377 F. Supp. 326 (D. Neb. 1974).
102 Id. at 340.
10 Id. at 342.
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dancing per se, and in the light of Peto must be limited to the facts out of
which the case arose."'104
Whether "topless" dancing, is protected by the first amendment was not
a question answered by the Clark Court. The court did, however, recognize
that when first amendment protections are involved only the judiciary and
not an administrative agency is capable of an independent and objective
determination.0 5
Clark established definite guidelines for the standard of review to be
utilized where a revocation is based on proscribed conduct such as "topless"
dancing. Because LaRue sustains the state police power under the twenty-
first amendment to prohibit conduct that constitutes gross sexuality, "[flirst,
the question of whether the performance depicts sexual conduct must be
decided." ' Next, the performance must be found to "constitute gross sexu-
ality"1 7 to be validly proscribed under the twenty-first amendment. The
third criterion applies to entertainment which is not of a gross sexual
nature such as "topless" dancing: "If the judicial fact finder determines
that the performance does not constitute gross sexuality, the performance
must be considered in light of first amendment obscenity standards...
of Miller."'
CONCLUSION
The regulation of a liquor permit holder who provides entertainment such
as "topless" dancing is another attempt to provide a law to protect man from
himself. When a liquor license is suspended because a bar owner presents
topless entertainment, many suffer. The permit holder has a loss of income.
His employees are hurt by a layoff. The customers of the licensee are de-
prived of their choice of entertainment and a place to meet with friends. 10
1041 d. at 339.
105 Id. at 337. See Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 522 F.2d 1045, 1048 (2nd Cir. 1975), in which
the Second Circuit held unconstitutional for overbreadth an ordinance which banned topless
dancing only in every "cabaret, bar or lounge, dance hall, discotheque, restaurant or coffee
shop." With respect to First Amentdment protections, the court recognized that there was
only a limited quantity of expression involved in "topless" dancing but that "modicum is
one of constitutional significance both to the dancers.., and, perhaps more to the customers
106 Id. at 342.
107 Id.
108 Id. See note 84 supra for a discussion of the Miller standards.
109 See Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21n.3 (1974), where the Second Circuit
considered the inequities in this type of censorship:
[While the entertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to those who can
pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by judges) or in quality (as viewed
by critics), it may not differ in substance from the dance viewed by the person who,
having worked overtime for the necessary wherewithal, wants some "entertainment"
with his beer or shot of rye.
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The local, state, and federal governments stop receiving revenue from the
sale of alcoholic beverages. The community loses from the cessation of the
multitude of services purchased from neighboring businesses. Who wins?
Whose interests are protected?
No adult who is offended by such entertainment need enter or remain
in a liquor license establishment which offers such entertainment. Neither will
the regulation of liquor provide a proper solution for social ills inside or
outside tavern walls. Unlawful behavior should be punished through the
appropriate criminal statutes. If a "topless" dancer's performance is un-
lawful, the conduct should be punished under the statute for nudity or
public indecency. Unlawful conduct occurring adjacent to liquor permit
premises can be controlled through criminal statutes for prostitution, rape,
or assault. The judicial system, not an administrative agency, is the proper
enforcer of these statutes.
Ohio's position, which denies to liquor license permit holders the
guarantees of the first and fourteenth amendments because the regulation
of liquor is involved, is wrongly conceived and should not be sustained.
RICHARD E. DOBBINS
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